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ABSTRACT 
Ecology and evolutionary biology is the study of 
life on this planet. One of the many methods 
applied to answering the great diversity of 
questions regarding the lives and characteristics of 
individual organisms, is the utilization of 
mathematical models. Such models are used in a 
wide variety of ways. Some help us to reason, 
functioning as aids to, or substitutes for, our own 
fallible logic, thus making argumentation and 
thinking clearer. Models which help our reasoning 
can lead to conceptual clarification; by expressing 
ideas in algebraic terms, the relationship between 
different concepts become clearer. Other 
mathematical models are used to better understand 
yet more complicated models, or to develop 
mathematical tools for their analysis. Though 
helping us to reason and being used as tools in the 
craftmanship of science, many models do not tell 
us much about the real biological phenomena we 
are, at least initially, interested in. The main reason 
for this is that any mathematical model is a 
simplification of the real world, reducing the 
complexity and variety of interactions and 
idiosynchracies of individual organisms. What such 
models can tell us, however, both is and has been 
very valuable throughout the history of ecology and 
evolution. Minimally, a model simplifying the 
complex world can tell us that in principle, the 
patterns produced in a model could also be 
produced in the real world. We can never know 
how different a simplified mathematical 
representation is from the real world, but the 
similarity models do strive for, gives us confidence 
that their results could apply. 
This thesis deals with a variety of different 
models, used for different purposes. One model 
deals with how one can measure and analyse 
invasions; the expanding phase of invasive species. 
Earlier analyses claims to have shown that such 
invasions can be a regulated phenomena, that 
higher invasion speeds at a given point in time will 
lead to a reduction in speed. Two simple 
mathematical models show that analysis on this 
particular measure of invasion speed need not be 
evidence of regulation.  
In the context of dispersal evolution, two 
models acting as proof-of-principle are presented. 
Parent-offspring conflict emerges when there are 
different evolutionary optima for adaptive behavior 
for parents and offspring. We show that the 
evolution of dispersal distances can entail such a 
conflict, and that under parental control of dispersal 
(as, for example, in higher plants) wider dispersal 
kernels are optimal. We also show that dispersal 
homeostasis can be optimal; in a setting where 
dispersal decisions (to leave or stay in a natal 
patch) are made, strategies that divide their seeds or 
eggs into fractions that disperse or not, as opposed 
to randomized for each seed, can prevail.  
We also present a model of the evolution of 
bet-hedging strategies; evolutionary adaptations 
that occur despite their fitness, on average, being 
lower than a competing strategy. Such strategies 
can win in the long run because they have a 
reduced variance in fitness coupled with a 
reduction in mean fitness, and fitness is of a 
multiplicative nature across generations, and 
therefore sensitive to variability. This model is used 
for conceptual clarification; by developing a 
population genetical model with uncertain fitness 
and expressing genotypic variance in fitness as a 
product between individual level variance and 
correlations between individuals of a genotype. We 
arrive at expressions that intuitively reflect two of 
the main categorizations of bet-hedging strategies; 
conservative vs diversifying and within- vs 
between-generation bet hedging. In addition, this 
model shows that these divisions in fact are false 
dichotomies. 
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 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
THEORY IN ECOLOGY AND 
EVOLUTION 
As ecologists and evolutionary biologists we are 
interested in the living world, but why do we need 
mathematics? Surely Darwin did not use any in his 
On the Origin. And surely, algebra is not living 
organisms, interacting and eating, dispersing and 
diversifying, being born and giving birth. Still, any 
textbook of ecology or evolution will contain at 
fair share of mathematical treatments of a number 
of issues, at least population dynamics (with 
different interactions) in ecology, and at least some 
population genetics and possibly other frameworks 
for representing evolutionary change in the latter. 
Some philosophers of science see the presence of 
mathematically rigorous theory as a sign of a 
mature science (see e.g. Godfrey-Smith 2003), 
though some working scientists are not very happy 
with the presence of a lot of mathematics, 
particularly so in ecology (e.g. Simberloff 1981; 
Simberloff 1982; Peters 1991). 
Regardless whether one sees the presence of 
mathematical treatments of particular phenomena 
or mechanisms as a sign of a mature science; 
mathematics is a pervasive part of evolution and 
ecology. By this I mean in addition to the 
calculations involved in statistics, which mainly 
deal with how to treat empirically collected data. 
Mathematical ecology and mathematical 
evolutionary biology is here, and it’s most likely 
here to stay. Unfortunately, at least in my mind, 
theory and mathematics is often mixed up within 
evolutionary ecology; some of the journals where 
mathematical treatments of ecological and 
evolutionary issues are more common than others 
(like Theoretical Population Biology and Journal 
of Theoretical Biology) bare names which easily 
gives the impression that mathematical treatments 
is what constitutes theory. I started my PhD 
thinking I was a theorist or theoretician, but I end 
it thinking that I am a modeller. There is much 
more to theory than just mathematical tinkering of 
models of interesting biological stuff. The best 
example of this is that natural selection (which in 
my perception is a theoretical concept) has several 
mathematical model formulations, but surely these 
mathematical formulations can not be considered 
the whole of natural selection, seeing as different 
models capture different aspects and that all 
models of evolutionary change make assumptions 
that are themselves subject to be altered by natural 
selection (but see Grafen 1999; Grafen 2007 and 
below). Theory also needs to give us 
interpretations of what these models and their 
constituent parts mean, and evolutionary ecology 
needs a philosophy that makes it clearer to both the 
interested common woman and the working 
scientist what these mathematical models actually 
contribute with. Theory is also often seen as much 
more than one model, but rather a family or cluster 
of models taken together (Levins 1966; Lloyd 
1988; Thompson 1989). Some do not agree with 
me in this division of models and theory (e.g. 
Fagerström 1987), while others think that theory is 
distinct from, but qualitatively improved by the 
inclusion of mathematics (Caswell 1988). In many 
cases the division is not needed. In addition, within 
ecology and evolution theory and models are often 
used interchangeably, and what one sees as a 
model, another sees as a theory. For the purpose of 
this introduction, they will be used 
interchangeably, and in cases where the difference 
is of importance it will be pointed out. 
Before we can get to what I see as my 
philosophy of mathematical models in 
evolutionary ecology, we need to spend some time 
on what models are.  
 WHAT ARE MODELS? 
Usually mathematical treatments of anything that 
purports to be reasonably inspired by some real (or 
imagined) phenomena are called models, but these 
are not the only models science deals with. For 
instance, in atomic physics, the way most people 
(by that I mean most people but hard core 
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 physicists perhaps) think about an atom is 
according to what is called the Rutherford-Bohr 
model. The modification of Rutherford’s model of 
the atom was presented by Niels Bohr about a 
century ago, and is a way to represent how we 
think an atom looks at a smaller-than-microscopic 
level, with electrons circling a positively charged 
nucleus. An example from biology is the double-
helix model of DNA. These are not purely 
mathematical (though there’s a lot of mathematics 
in the Rutherford-Bohr model if you dig into it), 
but perhaps more graphical. In biology we also 
deal with a number of model species, species that 
have been studied more extensively than other 
ones. These species are often seen as a model for 
at least some similar species, where findings about 
how something work in the fruit fly Drosophila 
melanogaster, might have relevance for other 
insects, and possibly also a wider range of animals. 
Yet a different model is the deductive-nomological 
model of how it was once thought that proper 
science was to be done. So models are more than 
just mathematical models.  
This is a list of some different kinds of models 
that Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
mentions; 
Probing models, phenomenological 
models, computational models, 
developmental models, explanatory 
models, impoverished models, testing 
models, idealized models, theoretical 
models, scale models, heuristic models, 
caricature models, didactic models, 
fantasy models, toy models, imaginary 
models, mathematical models, substitute 
models, iconic models, formal models, 
analogue models and instrumental models 
are but some of the notions that are used 
to categorize models. 
Note that they only list some of the notions used to 
categorize models (Frigg and Hartmann 2009).1 
                                                          
1
 Spending ones time constructing mathematical models of 
some particular behavior of individuals or pattern of living 
organisms, one often start to wonder what this really means (or 
at least this author has); how are we better equipped to 
understand or predict what goes on in the natural world by me 
Even if we are not willing to accept 
mathematically developed theory to be sign of a 
mature science, there is no doubt that mathematical 
models are prevalent within the fields of ecology 
and evolution, and that they have played an 
important part in the history of the fields. Within 
evolutionary biology R. A. Fisher, together with S. 
G. Wright and J. B. S. Haldane, working in the 
first half of the 20th century were instrumental, 
using mathematical models, in the development of 
the modern evolutionary synthesis that matured in 
the 1930-50’s. The modern synthesis is still seen, 
at least by most people (Pigliucci 2007), as the 
current paradigm of evolutionary biology (Mayr 
and Provine 1980; Mayr 1982).  
The models in this thesis are mathematical 
structures meant to have some similarity with the 
real world (Godfrey-Smith 2003). This similarity 
is hard to define in a more precise way; the chief 
reason for this is that they are not alike in the way 
they are similar to the real world. A second reason 
is that we can not possibly know everything about 
any real biological system, and therefore we can 
not easily judge how similar or how different a 
model is from it. I see the models in this thesis to 
be so similar to the real world that conclusions 
reached in the models could in principle hold for 
some or many biological systems. Whether these 
conclusions do hold or not is not for a model to 
answer to, only empirical studies can answer such 
questions. 
The models in this thesis are not used to 
analyse or treat empirical data and, as most 
mathematical models, they are analysed by treating 
a set of assumptions as true. These assumptions are 
of course not true, in the sense that they hold for 
some, many or all real biological systems, but the 
output of these models come about with complete 
                                                                                   
analysing this particular model? The most interesting part about 
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Models in 
Science is the end; “Models play an important role in science. 
But despite the fact that they have generated considerable 
interest among philosophers, there remain significant lacunas of 
our understanding of what models are and how they work.” 
(my emphasis). My consolation therefore is that philosophers 
are also a bit unclear on these issues. 
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 disregard for the truth-value of their assumptions. 
Mathematical models differ in the way they 
attempt to represent the world and both in how 
similar they are to the world and how they are 
similar to it. I find it therefore useful to attempt to 
make an overview of the value of mathematical 
models in ecology and evolution, without 
emphasis on their direct relation to the real world, 
but on how they are used by ecologists and 
evolutionary biologists, and more specifically how 
the use of models is legitimized by ecologists and 
evolutionary biologists. But before we delve into 
the different uses of models, we will look at one 
great optimist and a list of critics. 
MATHEMATICAL MODELS 
The fact that some mathematical models are often 
seen as important in the furthering of a field, have 
of course gathered a crowd of faithful believers in 
the prospects of mathematizing the fields of 
ecology and evolution. One extreme view is 
captured by a quote of L. B. Slobodkin; 
“We may reasonably expect to have 
eventually a complete theory for ecology 
that will not only provide a guide for the 
practical solution of land utilization, pest 
eradication, and exploitation problems but 
will also permit us to start with an initial 
set of conditions on the earth’s surface 
(derived from geological data) and 
construct a model that will incorporate 
genetics and ecology in such a way as to 
explain the past and also predict the future 
of evolution on earth.” (Slobodkin 1962, 
my emphasis) 
In this quote, Slobodkin exhibits a wide range of 
commitments to different views of how the world 
works, how we do science and what models are, in 
particular that models can be used to explain and 
predict aspects (indeed, all aspects) of the living 
world. Slobodkin’s belief, that with proper theory 
we could model and thus explain all past evolution 
and predict all future evolution and ecology on 
earth, is perhaps a bit on the optimistic side. Half a 
century later we are nowhere near having anything 
in the vicinity of what Slobodkin hoped for. 
Stephen J. Gould (1989) has famously asked the 
question, and attempted to give an answer (that 
Slobodkin would have been disappointed with), in 
a similar way; what would happen if we ‘replay 
the tape’ of evolution? If the history of life on 
earth had been rewound and played all over again, 
how would the world then look? Gould holds that 
not at all the same thing would happen (Gould 
1989). A more philosophically grounded version 
of this, which also would be a blow to Slobodkin’s 
belief in perfect predictability of evolution, is John 
Beatty’s contingency thesis (Beatty 1995), a 
proper elaboration inspired by Gould’s rewound 
videotape. Contingency can be thought of as 
something that is, at least partially, dependent on 
chance and in the context of evolution that would 
include all coincidences through the history of life 
(just think of the dinosaurs). But Beatty’s 
contingency thesis encompasses more than this; it 
holds that evolution, or more specifically natural 
selection, can in principle break down any pattern, 
mechanism or generality, and thus, we can not 
expect there to be any strong biological 
generalities that holds for evolving biological 
systems.  
Though many a mathematically inclined 
ecologist or evolutionary biologist obviously sees 
some value in the use of mathematical models, I 
suspect that most practicing modellers and 
theoreticians these days are not as optimistic as 
Slobodkin was. But before we delve into the 
potential benefits mathematics can have in ecology 
and evolution, we will focus on those that are not 
so optimistic about the use of models. 
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 CRITIQUE OF MATHEMATICAL 
MODELLING 
EXPLICIT ARGUMENTS 
Even if the past and future of evolution on earth is 
not entirely predictable or explainable, Slobodkin’s 
quote indicates a strong optimism about the value 
and promise of mathematical models. It has to be 
recognized, however, that some ecologists and 
evolutionary biologists have been a bit sceptical of 
mathematical treatments. In fact more than some 
and more than a bit. 
One of the contributors to the modern 
evolutionary synthesis, Ernst Mayr (1963), 
expressed his scepticism; 
“The Mendelian was apt to compare the 
genetic contents of a population to a bag 
full of coloured beans … To consider 
genes as independent units is meaningless 
from the physiological as well as the 
evolutionary viewpoint … These authors, 
although sometimes disagreeing with each 
other in detail or emphasis, have worked 
out an impressive mathematical theory of 
genetical variation and evolutionary 
change. But what, precisely, has been the 
contribution of this mathematical school 
to evolutionary theory, if I may be 
permitted to ask such a provocative 
question”2  (as quoted in Crow 2008). 
Mayr was obviously of the impression that the 
assumptions used in the early population genetical 
literature were highly unrealistic, and that such 
beanbag genetics had little scope for providing any 
valuable insight, since they were so far removed 
                                                          
2
 It should be mentioned that even though Ernst Mayr 
wrote this in his Animal Species and Evolution (1963), in his 
later work on the history of evolutionary thought (Mayr 1982, p 
555), he (rightfully) credited R. A. Fisher with contributing 
greatly to the reconciliation between geneticists and naturalists, 
particularly with his 1918 article (see section on Haldane’s 
defence). For many readers it was obvious that “these authors” 
were referring to Haldane, Fisher and Wright. 
from the complex reality of the real world. Notable 
ecologists at the same time also expressed their 
scepticism; 
“The ecologist should be careful to avoid 
the misuse of mathematics. Ecologists, 
and especially mathematicians with a 
slight knowledge of biology, seem to be 
prone to the mistake of building a model 
with symbols which, they pretend, 
represent certain qualities of animals. The 
symbols are then manipulated according 
to the rules of mathematics and, finally, 
the conclusions are translated into words 
which purport to describe some law of 
biology.” (Andrewartha and Birch 1954, 
p. 11) 
Andrewartha and Birch (1954) were worried that 
mathematical models often give an impression of 
truth, or are often taken in favour of particular 
hypotheses, almost in the same way empirical data 
are. In ecology, the regulation of populations (i.e. 
how they change in  numbers over time, and more 
importantly; what are the important factors that 
determine their change) has been an ongoing 
debate for close to a century (see Cooper 2003 for 
a nice history of the debates). Many of the 
proponents of the importance of density dependent 
factors (that e.g. birth rates decrease with high 
densities), have actually used mathematical models 
as arguments alone, such that the asserted 
importance of density dependent factors “… is not 
really a conclusion based on scientific experiment 
but rather that it has more of the status of dogma” 
(Andrewartha and Birch 1954). In the same vein, 
Hedgpeth (1977) noted that “Unfortunately […], 
many and for the most part those not directly 
concerned with modelling activity see in equations 
facts rather than ideas” (my emphasis). More 
recently the same is found of several of the classic 
mathematical models frequently referred to and 
introduced in most textbooks (e.g. the logistic 
model, the Lotka-Volterra models and Ricker 
models). They are in fact not supported by much 
evidence at all, particularly from natural systems 
(Hall and DeAngelis 1985; Hall 1988), and despite 
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 this it is very common for these models to be 
presented “more or less as truth” or as a “basic 
law” (Hall 1988).  
One of the reasons for why model results are 
sometimes (wrongfully) seen as evidence is that all 
models come with particular interpretations. Even 
in the simplest of models, far removed from the 
vicinity of being closely representative of any real 
biological systems, the particular aspects of a 
model are (usually) given biologically meaningful 
interpretations. Models have, for instance, 
parameters for mutation rates, clutch-sizes and 
longevity, concepts which refer to both meaningful 
and measurable quantities in real biological 
systems. Conclusions from a model, presented in a 
scientific article, will use the terminology and 
interpretation in a way that easily gives rise to the 
misunderstanding that they are stating facts. In 
Chapter II, for instance, we state that “…selection 
favours longer dispersal distances under maternal 
control of dispersal”, which sounds like it applies 
in general. This is of course not the case. 
Minimally, it applies only to our model; whether 
selection would actually favour longer dispersal 
distances under maternal control in real biological 
systems is not to be judged by the output of our 
model. This misunderstanding of model 
interpretation is, as noted by Hedgpeth (1977), 
perhaps more common among those not 
particularly familiar with models. Examples of 
such misinterpretations are numerous, particularly 
in evolutionary biology where models predicting a 
particular evolutionary response or optima 
consistent with empirical observations are often 
interpreted as evidence of them being adaptive 
(Gould and Lewontin 1979) or at least the result of 
selection (see for example the discussion on 
fisheries induced evolution, Jørgensen, Enberg et 
al. 2007; Browman, Law et al. 2008; Kuparinen 
and Merilä 2008). 
Others also contemplated on the dangers of too 
much mathematical modelling. This can be 
exemplified by Skellam (1972), who himself 
contributed with several mathematical treatments  
(e.g. Skellam 1951 is of relevance to this thesis); 
 “Without enlightenment and eternal 
vigilance on the part of both ecologists 
and mathematicians there always lurks the 
danger that mathematical ecology might 
enter a dark age of barren formalism 
fostered by an excessive faith in the magic 
of mathematics, blind acceptance of 
methodological dogma and worship of the 
new electronic gods.” (Skellam 1972) 
Perhaps the sharpest critic of the pervasive use of 
mathematical models in ecology was Robert H. 
Peters. In a range of different articles (Peters 1976; 
1978; 1980) and in his book A Critique for 
Ecology (1991), he puts forward his strong 
criticism against construing mathematical models 
of ecology and evolution as being scientific at all; 
“If scientific theories are characterized by 
predictive ability, the branches of science 
are distinguished by the objects of 
prediction. Ecology seeks to predict the 
abundances, distributions and other 
characteristics of organisms in nature.... 
This book contends that much of 
contemporary ecology predicts neither the 
characteristics of organisms nor much of 
anything else. Therefore it represents 
neither ecological nor more general 
scientific knowledge.” (Peters 1991) 
By ‘much of contemporary ecology’ Peters refers, 
among other things, to mathematical models, 
which according to him can not be considered 
theoretical at all. These models are but deductive 
games that provide some vague ‘insight’, and that 
they more often than not are entirely untestable. 
Peters suggests that ecology get rid of ideas of 
explanation (in the sense of understanding the 
causes of things) and just use mere predictions; if a 
curve-fitting produces a particular relationship 
between two variables in some mammals (say 
body size and densities), it predicts similar patterns 
in similar animals, and is therefore predictive, and 
therefore theoretical (Peters 1991). Any 
mathematical model that would attempt to include 
mechanisms that could produce such patterns (i.e. 
a model we investigate possible causal links 
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 between size of individuals and densities) are not 
needed and non-scientific. They are only 
tautologies which “…are not subject to empirical 
falsification and are incapable of prediction” 
(Peters 1976 p. 2). The charge of tautology is 
perhaps most discussed in the evolutionary 
literature on whether or not natural selection is a 
tautology (Peters 1976). Peters thinks so, but there 
have been put forward quite a few arguments 
against him (see for instance Sober 1984).  
Peters’ view of tautologies is somewhat 
complex. In propositional logic, a tautology is a 
sentence that is of the form ‘P or not P’; “It is 
raining, or it is not raining”. Such statements are, 
according to Peters, completely devoid of 
empirical content, are always true and are therefore 
not very useful in science, (note that his argument 
is not only based on whether or not mathematics 
itself is tautologous). He argues that mathematical 
models in general can only show what is possible, 
and that models therefore, in effect, are 
tautologies. For instance, one of the conclusions of 
chapter II in this thesis is that in our model there is 
a parent-offspring conflict over dispersal distances. 
This means that mothers would ‘prefer’ that their 
offspring disperse more widely than the offspring 
‘prefer’ themselves, hence there is a conflict over 
dispersal distances. This conflict is there in our 
model. But this model does not show anything else 
than the possibility of this conflict in real 
biological systems. The conflict might disappear 
for many reasons, through different mechanisms 
that we have excluded from the model (though one 
of them is analysed in the chapter). So the 
conclusion from the model is that ‘there can be a 
conflict over dispersal distances’. The 
interpretation in terms of the real world would be 
“there is conflict over dispersal distance OR there 
is not conflict over dispersal distance”, which is 
obviously of the form ‘P or not P’. And Peters 
does not recognize tautologies as being particularly 
scientific. 
Peters does not hold that mathematical models 
are completely useless for ecologists, but he is not 
willing to call them scientific; models can for 
instance be used to “…lessen our logical work 
load…” (Peters 1976), to clarify ideas and to 
perform other tasks in what he terms the 
‘subjective’ part of a scientist’s work (Peters 
1991). This subjective part can be described as 
anything that helps us in forming ideas. But just as 
having a particular language (say Italian) with 
fairly clear definitions helps us form ideas and 
shaping hypotheses, this language is not science.  
Other authors have also pointed to the fact that 
there is a dense jungle of models that do not even 
attempt to describe something that can possibly 
predict anything that can be held up against the 
natural world, and that the ‘field’ of theoretical 
ecology and evolution is close to being a field 
completely detached from empirical biology;  
“Models are being constructed, refined, 
elaborated, tinkered with, and displayed 
with little or no effort to link them with 
the real world.” (Pielou 1981) 
So not only do many mathematical models fit the 
world badly (Hall and DeAngelis 1985; Hall 
1988), they are also less frequently challenged by 
empirical investigations. This is also due to a lack 
of communication between modellers and 
empiricists; 
 “In the case of ecology, though, it seems 
as if many theoreticians are only able and 
willing to address other theoreticians, and 
as if a large portion of the theories are 
proposed only for their own sake.” 
(Grimm 1994) 
And it has been noted that such models seem to 
only pile up and become more and more distanced 
from empirical study of the biological world; 
“Ecology is awash in all manner of 
untested (and often untestable) models, 
most claiming to be heuristic, many 
simple elaborations of earlier untested 
models. Entire journals are devoted to 
such work, and are as remote from 
biological reality as are faith-healers” 
(Simberloff 1981). 
12
 Simberloff goes on to advice that mathematical or 
verbal theory “…without direct rigorous field 
testing no longer be recognized as a significant 
contribution” (Simberloff 1981). 
These are but some of the criticisms voiced 
over the presence or excesses of mathematical 
ecology and evolution (see particularly Chapter 5 
in Cooper 2003). There is a wide range of different 
problems highlighted, the most common ones 
being that there is a lot of mathematical models 
that either 1) are never (or can not) be properly 
tested and therefore say little about the real world, 
2) have been tested and failed the test but are still 
in widespread use and 3) mislead scientific 
endeavours, and 4) are de facto tautologies and are 
therefore not scientific. 
IMPLICIT ARGUMENTS 
In addition to these explicit critiques, there are 
some more implicit arguments against the use of, 
at least some, models in ecology and evolution. 
Many of the familiar models (logistic growth, 
Lotka-Volterra, population genetics etc), purport to 
be general. Generality is a frequently used 
description of models, though it is sometimes 
unclear what this generality entails (Cooper 2003). 
Sometimes a model is referred to as being general 
because other more specific models can be either 
derived from it or at least put in the same 
‘framework’ (see Chapter IV). Other times it 
seems like generality implies that a model attempts 
to describe general biological patterns or 
mechanisms, i.e. that the conclusions from a model 
should hold for many different taxonomic and 
ecological systems. In light of John Beatty’s 
‘contingency thesis’ (1995), it is not obvious that 
this can even possibly be achieved. It might be 
that, even though all biological populations 
undergo ecological fluctuations in size and 
distribution and evolutionary changes over long 
periods of time, there are very few such 
generalities to be found, since natural selection can 
break down any such pattern. The best example of 
this is that all models of evolutionary change make 
assumptions that are themselves the result of 
natural selection (Ruse 1973; Thompson 1989; 
Beatty 1995). 
Another implicit critique of the use of general 
models in ecology is based on a more practical 
view; the numerous challenges ecology needs to 
address and help society to deal with, that of 
environmental policy (Shrader-Frechette and 
McCoy 1993). Shrader-Frechette and McCoy 
(1993) argue that general ecological theory has 
rarely, if ever, contributed significantly to 
conservation and environmental problems, and that 
progress in conservation is usually based on case 
studies. That is, environmental problems are best 
tackled with in-depth, detailed knowledge of the 
particular system and not more general theories or 
models (see also Simberloff 1988). This can be 
seen as possibly giving rise to two fundamentally 
different ways of doing ecology (and evolutionary 
biology); top-down or bottom-up. Top-down 
ecology would be a scientific endeavour that starts 
with general models, based on idealized 
assumptions of how we think the world works (or 
at least could work). Then specific systems are 
compared to this idealized standard, and we learn 
perhaps something more about both the idealized 
standard and the specific population.  
Bottom-up ecology would be the science of 
case studies; there are millions of different species, 
with different distributions, diets, life-histories, 
predators etc., and the science of ecology and 
evolution would perhaps not look for general 
patterns, but be composed of a collection of case-
studies. Shrader-Frechette and McCoy are less 
sceptical of the use of more system-specific 
models (i.e. models tailored towards this particular 
fish in this particular pond) than they are of 
‘general’ models, because specific models can be 
of help in understanding the specific systems under 
threat (Shrader-Frechette and McCoy 1993). 
In their suggestions on how to strengthen 
ecology as a science Belovsky, Botkin et al. (2004) 
also recognized the problem of generalities; “We 
acknowledge that it may not be possible to pose 
universal statements that encompass all ecological 
scales of organization, space and time” (Belovsky, 
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 Botkin et al. 2004). Such universal statements are 
often what are being made in the interpretation of 
general models. 
RESPONSE TO THE CRITIQUE 
There have been numerous explicit responses to 
the criticisms voiced in the last section, some 
refuting the assumptions about what is to be 
considered scientific (as in challenging Peters 
(1991) staunch instrumentalism (Cooper 2003)), 
others emphasizing ideas about what different 
roles models play in scientific reasoning 
(Odenbaugh 2005) or posing legitimate theoretical 
pursuits (Caswell 1988). Roles of models and 
legitimate pursuits include, for instance, models as 
tools to help our logic (Haldane 1964), models as 
conceptual frameworks on which to build 
ecological and evolutionary research programs 
(Odenbaugh 2005) and the value in proving that 
something is in fact possible (Haldane 1964; 
Caswell 1988; Odenbaugh 2005). Others have yet 
argued that keeping a theory or a model, in spite of 
negative evidence against it can be advisable 
(Wimsatt 1987) and that models should be (and 
are) judged on other criteria than only testability 
and ‘passing’ of tests against the real world 
(Fagerström 1987). In addition, some have turned 
the tables and laid out arguments against the 
automatic preference for empirical work and value 
of ‘pure’ data (Fagerström 1987; Haila 1988), and 
that the validity and value of ‘testing’ is perhaps 
not as simple as often portrayed, at least not in the 
sense of automatically giving it preference to 
models. 
These were, at least partly, in defence of 
keeping the vast array and developments of 
mathematical models that are somewhat removed 
from the real world, and in some cases, 
demonstrably wrong. There has, nevertheless, also 
been a slight turn in the kind of models that are 
produced. Firstly, it is now more common with 
more system specific models, i.e. applying to only 
a particular species or population (Colwell 1984; 
Cooper 2003). Secondly, more models are tailored 
to be predictive, or have at least a tighter link with 
empirical data (see e.g. Clark and Gelfand 2006). 
Thirdly, there has also been a shift toward more 
mechanistic models, as an attempt to make them 
closer to the real biology than “faith-healers” 
(Cooper 2003), in addition to embracing a more 
pluralistic approach (McIntosh 1987). And lastly, 
the problems of generality and how general models 
relate to biological phenomena, have reached a 
debate on what generalities we can make, 
especially in ecology and whether or not there are 
laws in ecology (Lawton 1999). Some argue for 
some general law-like structures in ecology and 
evolution (Lawton 1999; Murray 2000; Turchin 
2001; Colyvan and Ginzburg 2003) , while others 
argue that there are no laws in ecology and that we 
don’t really need them (e.g. O'Hara 2005). 
I will go through some of the more substantial 
contributions to the response to the critics of 
mathematical models. There are, of course, also 
other expositions on the utility of models that have 
been voiced, though not in direct response to the 
criticisms above. One highly cited article is 
Richard Levins’ presentation on the strategies of 
model building (Levins 1966). Though not as a 
response to direct criticisms of the use of models, 
it serves as a nice starting point of our discussion 
of ways to legitimize model building in ecology 
and evolution. I also have to add that I do not 
claim that this is an exhaustive overview of all the 
responses that have been or could have been made 
against the charges above, only that it can be seen 
as a representative sample. 
LEVINS’ STRATEGY OF MODEL BUILDING  
Richard Levins has made several substantial 
contributions to the development of the 
mathematical side of evolutionary biology (e.g. 
Levins 1968), in addition to his contributions on 
philosophy and the more political side of biology 
in society (Levins and Lewontin 1985; Lewontin 
and Levins 2007). In 1966 he published an article 
called The strategy of model building in population 
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 biology, where he describes a trade-off between 
three potential goals of a model; realism, 
generality and precision (Levins 1966). One of his 
main arguments is that the real world is too 
complex to be accurately modelled in the sense of 
being realistic, general and giving precise outcome 
at the same time. He describes three strategies that 
have ‘evolved’, each of them sacrificing one of 
these to two others. Though some of his arguments 
are partly diminished by technology (particularly 
computers), these three different dimensions 
models can be compared in are, at least in my 
mind, still useful, at least in delimiting different 
directions a model could be extended; more (or 
less) realistic, general or precise. 
Levins states that his favoured side of this 
trade-off is to sacrifice precision to realism and 
generality. By this he seems to intend that the 
models he deals with are realistic (i.e. they include 
a larger set of mechanisms that he/we believe to be 
important for any given problem) and general 
(they rarely make very specific assumptions that 
would make the models apply to or describe 
specific systems), but they are less precise (they 
often give qualitative answers). His approach can 
partly be contrasted with the earlier population 
genetical models that were already well developed 
in his days, which can be said to be general and 
precise, but perhaps not so realistic. It is, however, 
important to realize that Levins did not intend this 
’trade-off’ to be absolute, he merely pointed out 
some of the different directions models in 
population biology had taken at that time (Levins 
1993). It might also be pointed out that for any 
given model, it might be changed to be both more 
realistic, more general and more precise, even 
though it might not be possible to maximize these 
at the same time (Levins 1993). 
Levins also describes some of the pitfalls in 
using models; 
”There is always room for doubt as to 
whether a result depends on the essentials 
of a model or on the details of the 
simplifying assumptions. This problem 
does not arise in the more familiar models, 
such as the geographic map, where we all 
know that contiguity on the map implies 
contiguity in reality, relative distances on 
the map correspond to relative distances in 
reality, but colour is arbitrary and a 
microscopic view of would only show the 
fibres of the paper on which it is printed. 
But, in the mathematical models of 
population biology, it is not always 
obvious when we are using too high a 
magnification” (Levins 1966) 
By ‘the essentials of a model’, he most surely 
is referring to the parameters or relations in a 
model that purports to be a more accurate 
representation of a biological system, that there is 
some similarity to the real system. But before 
delving into how one can get at these essentials, I 
wish to follow his analogy of a mathematical 
model of ecological or evolutionary phenomena to 
that of a geographic map, since this analogy is 
often drawn (e.g. Kokko 2007; McElreath and 
Boyd 2007). 
Levins underlines the problem of putting a 
map under the microscope; you will not see the 
street you live in and the neighbour’s dog running 
in the yard3. The map is a representation of how 
the world looks from above, and is only useful at a 
particular scale of analysis and it’s useless to zoom 
in too much. But the opposite is also true; the maps 
of the world that are present in most classrooms 
(or schoolbooks) are also a mere representation of 
the world. But in these maps, contiguity is not 
guaranteed; we know the world is round, but still 
Antarctica is at the bottom and it seems like the 
world ends to the west of the Americas and to the 
east of the pacific. Even worse, at such a scale, 
relative distances do no even hold (usually); in fact 
there is a wide range of different ways to project 
the world (a sphere) onto a two dimensional flat 
piece of paper. Some of these projections are used 
for navigation (like one of the most common, the 
Mercator projection), and actually keep angles 
more than relative distances (it seems as the 
distance around the world 5 kilometres south of the 
                                                          
3
 At least for classic maps on paper, perhaps not so for 
Google Earth. 
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 north pole is the same as around the equator and 
Greenland looks the size of Africa, which is about 
15 times as large in km2). So if the map is a good 
example of a model, there is the danger of both 
zooming in too much and out too much; any good 
model works only within a particular scale (in this 
case a spatial scale). It also shows that, to represent 
the globe on a plane, there is no right or wrong; it 
all depends on the purpose; right angles for 
navigation is perhaps a better one, but it is not a 
more correct representation of the world. 
There is a second aspect that we can learn 
from thinking of maps as models; that they are 
fraught with conventions which have a more 
contingent historical basis than any basis in being a 
better representation. Some might argue that 
putting north up, using the Mercator projection, 
and putting Europe in the middle is a conventional 
remnant of the colonial past, but whether or not we 
choose to see this as a result of human history and 
politics, we surely recognize it as not being 
dependent on representing the world more 
accurately. This property is much the same in the 
mathematical models used in ecology and 
evolution; there are so many conventions on how 
to set them up, and this can be problematic; it 
makes it harder to think outside the box. If one 
searches the latest editions of any ecological or 
evolutionary journal, finds an article that uses 
mathematical models, I suspect that close to all of 
them will be models which are only slightly 
different compared to models presented before. 
When somebody suddenly does move outside 
these conventions, however, it can become a very 
fruitful avenue of new developments of models. 
One good example of this is in the simplicity of 
Price’s publication of his now-famous equation 
(Price 1970). In his Nature article published in 
1970 (without any references), George Price 
presented work that has been so successful as a 
description of natural selection and evolution (see 
for instance Frank 1995; Rice 2004; Gardner 2008) 
that it has lead well-regarded mathematical 
biologists to print T-shirt stating ‘The Price is 
Right’ in its honour. But there can be no doubt that 
most mathematical biologists work within a wide 
set of conventions, and they can be just as 
misleading as thinking that Europe really is that 
big and in the middle of the world. 
Levins also recognized the problem of 
conventions, or at least the problem of making 
some sort of assumption(s) which is not of 
importance for the problem at hand. His main 
response to this was to argue for making several (if 
not many) models of the same biological 
phenomena, but building them with the explicit 
intention of making different particular 
assumptions. The Mercator, Gall-Peters or Albers 
projection of the world onto a plane can not 
individually represent the world the way it 
properly looks; while together, a wide range of 
different projections might give a more proper 
view of the world. In the same vein, Levins 
emphasizes the importance of making several 
models; that making several different kinds of 
models of the same phenomena, if the results are 
similar they are more robust, and quips; 
“Hence our truth is the intersection of 
independent lies” (Levins 1966). 
It is unclear, however, what Levins means by this 
“truth”, if it is intended to be the truth about the 
real world, or if it’s intended to be about the 
possibility of the particular pattern in the real 
world. The only way that more models of the same 
can make it more likely or probable that the 
modelled process is important in real natural 
systems (or “true”), is if we assume that there is a 
finite number of ways the world could work. One 
model shows that something is possible, and if 
there is only N number of ways the world could 
possibly work, the analysis of the model has 
increased the probability of it being “true” for 
natural systems by 1/N. That there are only a finite 
ways of representing the world, however, is a 
highly contentious issue, and one that I am 
personally not convinced by. 
A third aspect of the geographical map as a 
model is worth mentioning is that the map is meant 
to be purely descriptive. There is no inherent 
explanation in a map. The presence of a lake does 
not explain why there is a mountain four clicks to 
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 the east. There is no way that we can manipulate 
parts of the map, and see what happens to some 
other aspect of it. In a mathematical model, we can 
often change the setting of one parameter 
(increasing competition, number of species or 
whatever is relevant in the model), and we 
investigate the consequences of this. A 
geographical map does not work in that way, but it 
is the way that we usually want mathematical 
models to work. 
Levins’ Strategy of Model Building, does not 
explicitly relate to the value of models, except for 
in the claim that our “truth is the intersection of 
our independent lies”, but is more a description of 
how models are built in population biology. 
HALDANE’S DEFENCE 
The charge and question by Mayr (1963) of what 
population geneticists have contributed, was 
interpreted by J. B. S. Haldane to be directed at 
himself, R. A .Fisher and S. G. Wright, and he 
wrote a direct response in A Defense of Beanbag 
Genetics (Haldane 1964). In this polemic article he 
gives many examples of what he sees as the main 
values of population genetics models, and makes 
several points. First, he sees phrasing hypotheses 
or ideas in the form of algebra is of help, because 
compared to verbal arguments or lines of 
reasoning, they are forced to be entirely logical or 
rational. He mentions a few examples (of Mayr’s 
own work of course), where the verbal reasoning 
seems insufficient and so complex that phrasing 
them in the form of a mathematical model would 
clarify the line of thought; “I hope I have given 
enough examples to justify my complete mistrust 
of verbal arguments, where algebraic arguments 
are possible…” (Haldane 1964). This is an explicit 
mention of the use of mathematical models as a 
way to externalize our rational thinking, they work 
as tools of logic that we can depend on when our 
internal logic seems insufficient. By putting our 
ideas and reasoning in mathematical form, 
concepts are clarified, relations are made explicit 
and often quantitative, and following the logic is 
usually made easier. Note that this is regardless of 
whether the ‘model’ or reasoning will apply to any 
biological system. It is a methodological argument. 
It is worth pointing out that models as an 
externalization of our logic can either be fully 
externalized or only partially. For instance, in 
chapter II we present fairly complex individual-
based models where there are a number of 
assumptions that form the basis for the calculations 
performed in the model. The output of the model 
follows from our assumptions according to the 
‘rules’ we have defined to be in the model (and the 
logic of mathematics). This is an example in which 
our logic can be seen as fully externalized, and 
even with analysing the output of the model it is 
perhaps difficult for us to understand everything 
that happens in the model. On the other hand, in 
chapter IV we present a general population genetic 
model. We posit two alleles that can differ in their 
mean and variance of fitness, and use the 
reproductive successes (Ri) of two genotypes as 
(see appendix of chapter IV for the details) 
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Using these fitnesses for the two alleles, we arrive 
at the following equation describing the change in 
the frequency of the first allele; 
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Now, for many (again, at least for this author), 
immediately understanding how equation (2) 
follows from equation (1) is hard. But by making 
the derivation explicit (as we do in the appendix to 
chapter IV), it is easier to follow the logic of every 
step taken, and in this case the model serves as a 
partial externalization of our logic. Instead of 
relying entirely on the mathematics to be logical 
while giving up full understanding of the model, 
we explicate the algebra and it functions more as 
an aid to our logic, than a substitute for our logic. 
Haldane also mentions one of the most 
commonly presented virtues of biologically 
motivated models; “It is, in my opinion, worth 
while devoting some time to proving the obvious” 
(Haldane 1964). By this he is invoking the general 
use of model as proof-of-principle; by setting up a 
model where the assumptions are not too far from 
what could be a fairly realistic representation of a 
biological system, the outcome of a model must be 
seen as a possibility, even in real systems. We will 
return to this below. Haldane realized that 
possibility might be misinterpreted as actuality, as 
pointed out above (Andrewartha and Birch 1954; 
Skellam 1972; Hedgpeth 1977); 
“There is, however, a danger that when 
mathematical investigation shows a 
possible cause of a phenomenon, it is 
assumed that it is the only possible cause” 
(Haldane 1964). 
The value of proving the possible has also 
been pointed out by several other biologists; 
according to Lewontin for instance, mathematical 
developments “… is the science of the possible” 
(Lewontin 1968, also see following sections). This 
was also recognized by Peters (1991), but he did 
not deem them to be legitimate pursuits of 
ecology, or that they were scientific due to their de 
facto tautologous nature. 
Through the history of ecology and evolution, 
however, there are many such proof-of-principle 
contributions that have been of value. One thing to 
point out in this regard is that data or observations 
are never theory-free, they are theory-laden; there 
is no such thing as observations that are 
completely devoid of some mindset or without any 
degree of expectation to it (also see the 
introduction of chapter I below). This can lead to 
two fallacies. Firstly it can lead to a conclusion 
based on empirical analysis that does not recognize 
the “theory” behind the analysis and the 
observations (again, see introduction of chapter I 
below). Secondly, and even worse, often data that 
don’t fall into the current expectation of 
observations are often neglected or disregarded. 
One example from evolutionary biology is the 
presence of helpers at the nest of some birds (see 
Fagerström 1987). These helpers are individuals 
who aid other parents raise their chicks, and were 
once seen as unexplainable by evolutionary theory, 
and therefore “impermissible” observations. They 
were often termed abnormal and were likened to 
other irrelevant reproductive behaviour (like 
homosexuality). It was not until the theoretical 
development of kin selection, whereby individuals 
are expected to have an ‘interest’ in the survival 
and reproduction of other related individuals than 
their direct descendants (Hamilton 1964a; 1964b), 
that these observations were made permissible by 
rigorous mathematical models. Showing that 
something was possible from an evolutionary 
standpoint increased the recognition of such 
behaviour as not necessarily aberrant, but perhaps 
even adaptive (Fagerström 1987). Going even 
further back, R. A. Fishers demonstration that 
continuous variation was indeed possible with 
discrete Mendelian units of inheritance (Fisher 
1918) was instrumental in settling a long dispute in 
early evolutionary biology, and indeed paving way 
for the modern evolutionary synthesis (Mayr 
1982). So in many cases, just proving that 
something is possible is well worth the effort. 
So models can help us in our rational thinking 
or our logic, and they can also be seen as proof-of-
principle models; they can prove what is possible. 
Externalization of our logic does not necessarily 
entail any empirical implications, but proving what 
is possible can. 
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 CASWELL’S DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE 
Hal Caswell is a well-renowned mathematical 
ecologist, particularly for his work on structured 
population models (Caswell 1989). As a reply to 
Simberloff’s (1981) complaint about the presence 
of too many models in ecology, he published a 
small paper on theory and models in ecology 
(Caswell 1988). In his defence of the usefulness of 
models, he ends up with a “beginning of a list of 
types of theoretical problems” he thinks are 
valuable contributions to the furthering of ecology; 
1. Exploring the consequences of theory. 
2. Demonstrating the connection between 
apparently unrelated theories. 
3. Evaluating the robustness of, or lack 
thereof, of theoretical results, by 
examining different models for the same 
phenomenon. 
4. Developing mathematical methods for the 
analysis of theoretical models. 
5. Finding the simplest possible model 
capable of generating an observed pattern. 
6. Designing empirical and/or experimental 
tests of theory. 
Caswell’s main point was that there are many other 
virtues of theory or mathematical models besides 
developing explicit tests of them, thereby 
responding to the charge that these models are 
often not tested, and if they are they often fail. 
The last point (6) is the one recognized by the 
critics as having scientific value. Models that 
generate clear predictions that can be held against 
the natural world are valuable. Caswell does not, 
however, explicitly point to how one should deal 
with models that are demonstrably wrong, or 
models which yield wrong predictions. By 
exploring the consequences he points to the same 
as Haldane (1964); showing that something is, 
indeed, possible. The purpose of developing 
different models for the same phenomena (3) has 
also been proposed before, most notably by Levins 
(see above). Demonstrating the link between 
seemingly unrelated models/theories (2) and 
developing different models for the same 
phenomena (3) can be construed as somewhat of a 
contradiction; one goal is to link seemingly 
different models and the other is to explicitly 
develop different models. In a more dynamic 
scientific perspective, however, it makes sense. 
First we might show a particular pattern could 
arise from one kind of model, it acquires 
robustness from a different model showing the 
same, and over time some overarching general 
model can perhaps subsume all of the previous 
ones. 
Alan Grafen’s (e.g. 1999; 2006; 2007) Formal 
Darwinism project is a recent and good example of 
Caswell’s point (2). Grafen laments that “... there 
are many mathematical models that show natural 
selection at work, but they are all examples” 
(Grafen 2007). The aim is to mathematically 
develop a theory that “captures Darwin’s argument 
in its entirety” (Grafen 2007) and to clearly show 
the explicit relationships between these different 
mathematical versions of evolution and natural 
selection. This is clearly in line with demonstrating 
the link between models/theories. 
Point (4) claims that it is a legitimate pursuit 
of ecological and evolutionary theory to develop 
mathematical methods for the analysis of 
theoretical models. Development of the basic 
tenets and general mathematics behind the 
framework of adaptive dynamics serve as a nice 
example of this (e.g. Geritz, Kisdi et al. 1998; 
Geritz, Gyllenberg et al. 2002; Geritz 2005; Kisdi 
and Geritz 2010), adaptive dynamics being one of 
several ways of modelling evolutionary changes. 
Much of this literature can be considered fairly 
distant from real biological systems, but 
nevertheless analysis of more specific models of 
biological problems are made easier with such 
theory. Some might argue that, though they are 
legitimate pursuits, they perhaps belong more to 
the area of mathematics proper, and perhaps not 
ecology or evolution. 
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 Trying to find the simplest possible model that 
can produce an observed pattern (5), is a subset of 
point (1); proving what is indeed possible. The 
idea of Ockham’s razor comes to mind; if there are 
two different models that both are plausible and 
both produce the same pattern, then the one that is 
‘simpler’ should be given higher rank, due to its 
simplicity. We do not need to invoke more 
complex mechanics if it can be explained or 
produced by simpler means. This principle of 
parsimony is of widespread use in ecology and 
evolution, as well as science in a wider sense. As a 
guiding principle it can be seen as having scientific 
value, but for many practical purposes it can also 
be confusing; all models are often not plausible to 
the exact same extent. Even if simpler models can 
produce the same pattern as more complex models, 
these more complex models are often considered 
to be stronger in realism, in that they take more of 
the known mechanisms into account. The choice 
between a simple but unrealistic model and a 
complex, more realistic model will then not solely 
be guided by the principle of parsimony. Also, in 
many cases of evolutionary theory, we are not just 
interested in the simplest possible factor or 
explanation of a pattern, but to charter as many 
possibilities as possible. The favouring of 
dispersive traits through natural selection, for 
instance, can come about through spatio-temporal 
variability in availability of resources, avoidance 
of kin competition or avoidance of inbreeding (see 
below). If we were to explain the presence of 
dispersal in natural systems, deciding which of 
these models of dispersal evolution is the simplest 
is perhaps both difficult and not recommended. Is 
it simpler to assume that the population is 
structured in space (which makes you compete 
more with kin) or that the environment is variable 
in space and time (which would lead to variability 
in availability of resources)? We could also, for 
instance, be interested in all possible mechanisms 
that could lead to the evolution of dispersal, and 
not only the simplest one.  
Regardless of the problems of parsimony and 
finding the simplest possible model that can 
produce an observed pattern, it does emphasize an 
important point in the evaluation of models; that 
models are evaluated, not only on their ability to 
predict and fit patterns in the real world, but also 
on other aspects, for instance their simplicity. 
Fagerström has also highlighted other aspects of a 
model. 
FAGERSTRÖM’S CRITERIA FOR GOOD 
MODELS 
Fagerström (1987) makes the case for models to be 
judged not solely by their ability to produce results 
consistent with data from real biological systems, 
and charters these other criteria in a pragmatic 
sense; by looking at how individual models or 
theories have been judged through the history of 
ecology and evolution.  
He lists simplicity as one of the criteria of a 
good ecological theory; that it is possible to 
understand both the assumptions behind the model, 
and why the implications follow from the 
assumptions. He does not directly refer to the 
principle of parsimony, but that models are more 
easily accepted if they are easy to understand. 
They might not at all be better at predicting what 
happens in real biological systems, in fact, he uses 
the Lotka-Volterra equations as an example of 
models being kept despite negative evidence 
against them (Fagerström 1987). If we were to 
extend the Lotka-Volterra equations to include all 
possible more realistic aspects of a population, the 
model would become so complex that most people 
would not feel they understood the mechanics of it 
to the same extent as very simple models. In a 
way, the idea of simplicity can be seen as 
appealing to a partial externalizing our logic. If 
models are too simple, we might not need the 
mathematics to help us, and if they are too 
complicated, we might not feel that we understand 
the model at all, but somewhere in between, the 
mathematics is more of an aid in understanding. 
As noted above, there’s a difference between 
mathematics as an aid to our logic and a substitute 
for our logic. (It could be pointed out that this 
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 difference is perhaps not absolute, but will vary 
from person to person). 
 A second criterion is that models need to be 
consistent with prevailing ideas in the scientific 
communities; the logistic equation describing 
population growth is consistent with the general 
idea that if some resource is limited, then there has 
to be some upper limit to how large populations 
can grow. 
A third reason why models, like the Lotka-
Volterra equations again, have a predominant 
place in ecology is that they have been productive. 
Simple models that give rise to development of 
new concepts and ideas are often successful. The 
basic models of kin selection and community 
dynamics need only be mentioned, these have 
sparked off an immense literature of both 
theoretical and empirical value. It should be noted, 
however, that with this criteria Fagerström is 
getting quite close to measuring the success of 
models by the success of models, which is 
obviously not too informative. 
One of the last commonalities he finds among 
successful models is their beauty. Sometimes a 
model “... may evoke a feeling of having glimpsed 
truth like a crystal; clear, hard and pure” 
(Fagerström 1987). He claims that such beauty is 
often in a combination of generality and economy 
(simplicity), that a model is “... universal in 
content and pregnant in form”, a feeling not unlike 
this author’s when he first spelled out equation (8) 
in chapter IV. The recognition of such beauty is 
perhaps more common among mathematicians 
than ecologists, but it nevertheless has an impact 
on how successful a model becomes.  
The last point that Fagerström (1987) delves 
upon is the idea that all models need to be tested, 
or that they need to be challenged by the natural 
world, to see if they hold up to empirical scrutiny. 
He does recognize this as an important aspect of 
some models, and that testing as a way of “finding 
the truth”, should perhaps be seen as an ultimate 
demand on well developed theories. This does, 
according to him, not mean that they are the only 
proximate purposes of models. So models should, 
in the long run, perhaps be held up against nature, 
but in a shorter time-perspective, this need not be 
their main purpose. 
ODENBAUGH’S BASIC PURPOSES OF 
MODELS 
Jay Odenbaugh, a philosopher of science with 
emphasis on biology, has written several accounts 
on the use of models in ecology in particular 
(Odenbaugh 2001; Odenbaugh 2003; Odenbaugh 
2005; Odenbaugh 2006). If Fagerström’s (1987) 
inspection of what is common to many models 
being used or successful in ecology and evolution, 
Odenbaugh has gone into more depths as to what 
they are being used for. This can perhaps be more 
of help than Fagerström’s (1987) since, for 
instance, it is hard to judge a model on its 
productivity the day it is presented. In one of 
Odenbaugh’s expositions on models in ecology 
(Odenbaugh 2005), he charters for what different 
purposes models are used in theoretical biology4; 
1. Models are used to explore 
possibilities. 
2. Models give scientists simplified 
means by which they can investigate 
more complex systems. 
3. Models provide scientists with 
conceptual frameworks. 
4. Models can be used to generate 
accurate predictions. 
5. Models can be used to generate 
explanations. 
 
He avoids elaborating on the last two points, and 
the first point here is already discussed, proof-of-
principle.  
Odenbaugh uses the Lotka-Volterra predator-
prey equations as an example of how simple 
models can be used to investigate more complex 
systems. He sees the Lotka-Volterra equations as a 
false model, with which we can use as a basis to 
                                                          
4
 Odenbaugh is very explicit in that he does not mean that 
this list is exhaustive. 
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 investigate what needs to be added to the models 
to better predict real systems. The rationale is that 
models do not just fail, but that they fail in 
particular ways and for reasons that can be 
informative. All predator-prey interactions do not 
consist of the perfect oscillations and limit cycles 
that appear in the Lotka-Volterra equations, and 
how we need to change these models to fit the 
world better can be informative (Odenbaugh 
2005). 
A concept is an abstract idea, and Odenbaugh 
argues that models can serve as conceptual 
frameworks. Odenbaugh puts forth the example of 
the quest for an old ecological proposition, first 
proposed by Elton (1958); that more complex 
ecosystems are more stable. This hypothesis was 
phrased as simply as that, but some years later 
mathematical models of the ideas were presented 
(May 1973;  see also Pimm 1984). These models 
have helped develop the concepts of complexity 
and stability. As soon as Elton’s idea was 
formulated in algebraic form in idealized 
communities it became apparent that both 
complexity and stability were not unambiguous 
concepts, there were different aspects of the model 
that would correspond to what we intuitively 
would see as both complexity and stability. So 
these models have functioned as conceptual 
frameworks, in that they, perhaps despite their 
“falsity” have helped as logical aids in developing 
more consistent and clearly defined concepts. This 
is related to Fagerström’s (1987) notice that 
successful models are often productive and 
Haldane’s (1964) externalization of logic as well 
as a general proving the possible perspective. 
WIMSATT’S VALUABLE FALSE MODELS 
William C. Wimsatt, a philosopher of science who 
also studied population biology under Lewontin 
and Levins, has presented a view that false models 
can in many cases have genuine scientific value, 
despite the fact that they are false (Wimsatt 1987). 
This also falls in line with the famous quote by R. 
A. Fisher’s son-in-law, George E.P. Box;  
“Remember that all models are wrong; the 
practical question is how wrong do they 
have to be to not be useful”  (Box and 
Draper 1987). 
Wimsatt first notes that models can be false or 
wrong in many different ways; for instance, they 
could have local applicability, in which case it is 
false if applied outside its domain; it could also be 
an idealization, which means that the conditions 
for the model to hold are never found in nature (for 
instance treating population sizes as continuous 
variables, with the possibility of 138.92 
individuals). Thirdly a model can be incomplete, in 
that it leaves out one or more relevant variable. 
Models can be purely phenomenological; in that 
they are derived only to make predictions or 
descriptions, and that the parameters of the model 
are not given an explicit meaningful interpretation. 
One example of this would be classic models of 
allometric growth, the study of the how the rates of 
growth of different parts of the body relate to the 
body as a whole (Huxley 1932). This study 
includes a general model of allometric scaling, in 
which the interpretation of one of the parameters in 
the model “… is here of no particular biological 
significance,…” (Huxley 1932 p. 4), however see 
an attempt in White and Gould (1965). 
Lastly, models can be false in the way that 
they give a “totally wrong-headed” picture of 
nature (where posited entities or properties do not 
exist) and, the classic; fail to describe or predict 
data correctly.  
He then goes on to make a list of functions that 
false models can serve, “in the search for better 
ones”  (Wimsatt 1987 p. 30, my emphasis), 
indicating that false models’ highest virtue is in the 
search for better models. It is somewhat unclear 
what he deems to be better models, but the final 
test of predictability of data must surely be one of 
the standards ‘better’ models are held to. This list 
is too long for complete inclusion here (12 
elaborated points), but a few notes on some of the 
merits of false models will be made. All of the 
merits of models already mentioned are in some 
form or another included in Wimsatt’s list. 
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 Wimsatt argues that, when it comes to 
arguments about optimization and adaptive design, 
an important aspect of evolutionary models, false 
models can be built with the explicit goal of being 
false. This is also noted by R. A. Fisher (1930;  
and others, e.g. Maynard-Smith 1982) who argued 
for, as an example, constructing models where 
species consist of three (or more) different sexes, 
to better understand why there are always two. 
Models like these are frequently made in studies of 
adaptation, where we need to consider why a 
particular attribute of an organism is adaptive by 
attempting to model a non-existent alternative, and 
show that they are likely to be maladaptive. 
Another important role false models can play 
is to describe two ends at a continuum, where 
reality is supposedly somewhere in the middle, but 
also where this ‘middle’ becomes very 
complicated to both model and understand. One 
example related to this can be in our exposition in 
chapter IV (also in Levins 1968 use of an 
"adaptive function"), where the grain of the 
environment can be understood as being 
somewhere between the extremes of fine-grained 
and coarse-grained. Calculations and analysis of 
models where the ‘grain’ of the environment is 
somewhere in-between is slightly more complex, 
but there are some lessons to be learnt from just 
posing the two extremes, both of which are 
perhaps unlikely.  
SELECTED TEXTBOOKS IN MATHEMATICAL 
EVOLUTION AND ECOLOGY 
The utility of models in ecology and evolution is 
often mentioned in textbooks about modelling. 
How the use of models is legitimized in two books 
will be used as examples. 
In John Maynard-Smith’s now classic book on 
the use of game theory in evolution (Maynard-
Smith 1982) he alludes to the different values of 
models. For instance about the Lotka-Volterra 
equations he states that, despite the fact that they 
“are manifestly false […] their merit is to show 
that even the simplest possible model of such an 
interaction leads to sustained oscillation.” He here 
invokes the ‘proving the possible’ argument, in a 
mixture of Caswell’s point 1 and 5 above. He also 
uses the same argument that Haldane uses, that 
mathematical models help us in our reasoning, 
because these sustained oscillations (i.e. cycles) of 
the Lotka-Volterra equations is a “… conclusion it 
would have been hard to reach by purely verbal 
reasoning” (Maynard-Smith 1982).  
Maynard-Smith also notes on the Hawk-Dove 
game, a game that purports to be some 
representation of animal contests, that the game 
“… is not to represent any specific animal 
example, but to reveal the logical possibilities (for 
example, the likelihood of mixed strategies) 
inherent in all contest situations” (Maynard-Smith 
1982, my emphasis). Here he is more ambiguous; 
he states that the models are not meant to represent 
any specific example, but still that they reveal the 
logical possibilities in all contest situations, which 
seems to imply that this model not only shows 
what is possible, but that it can map the space of 
the possible in its entirety for all contest situations. 
So this is a statement about both general models 
and the real world of contests. 
He also talks about general theories 
(“evolution is the result of the natural selection of 
variations which in their origin are non-adaptive” 
(Maynard-Smith 1982, p. 8) ) and specific theories 
(“theories which claim to identify the selective 
forces responsible for the evolution of particular 
traits or groups of traits.”), and that general 
theories are not necessarily to be directly tested, 
but only tested through their relation to more 
specific theories or models. This is related to 
Fagerström’s ideas on proximate and ultimate 
goals of models, but phrased in a sense that more 
general models have as a proximate goal to be 
used to develop more specific models, which can 
be directly tested, or at least give some predictions.  
Mathematical Models of Social Evolution 
(McElreath and Boyd 2007) is a recent 
contribution to the growing textbook material for 
models of ecology and evolution. They start the 
book by stating that “simple mathematical models 
are experiments aimed at understanding the causal 
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 relationships that drive important natural 
phenomena“ (McElreath and Boyd 2007 p. 1), 
perhaps purposefully vague. But they continue to 
list four different ways simple models can “aid our 
understanding” of the world. One of them is of 
course to give rise to predictions, to be tested 
against the natural world. But the other three 
points are worthy of mentioning. 
Models can provide existence proof. This is at 
first glance the same as Caswell’s point (1) 
(exploring the consequences of theory) and 
Maynard-Smith’s revealing of logical possibilities. 
They continue on these existence proofs that “they 
provide proof that some candidate set of processes 
could explain the observations of interest” but they 
go further than others by stating that existence 
proofs also “narrow down the fields of 
possibilities”. It seems like models can not only 
prove the possible, but also proving the 
impossible. This is a conjecture I am not 
convinced by; a model can prove that something is 
in principle possible in the real world, but it can 
not prove that something is not possible in the 
natural world. It can, however, prove that 
something is not possible in the model.  
One example from evolutionary biology that 
serves to illustrate that models should not be seen 
as delineating what is impossible, is the history of 
reinforcement in studies of speciation. 
Reinforcement is the idea that prezygotic isolation 
is enhanced by natural selection in sympatry 
(Coyne and Orr 2004). Put simply, imagine two 
seemingly different species where there is some 
level of hybridization, but these hybrid have a 
reduced fitness, will then natural selection lead to 
behaviour that reduces this hybridization? Decades 
ago, this was thought to be, not only possible, but 
also probable. In fact, Dobzhansky even thought 
that such selection against hybridization 
represented a nearly obligate step in speciation 
(Coyne and Orr 2004, p. 353), and its importance 
was also highlighted by others (e.g. Lewontin 
1974). The acceptance of the theory of 
reinforcement fell dramatically in the late 1980’s, 
not because of lack of empirical support, but 
because of an interpretation of models in which it 
was unlikely to occur, as showing that the process 
was unlikely in the real world (e.g. Spencer, 
McArdle et al. 1986;  see also Noor 1999; 
Marshall, Arnold et al. 2002). Again, as 
commented on by Andrewartha and Birch (1954), 
people mistook conclusions from models to apply 
directly as conclusions of the world. After the 
decline of the appreciation of the importance of 
reinforcement in speciation, it rose to prominence 
again in the 1990’s and later, because of a 
combination of more models and data (Noor 1999; 
Marshall, Arnold et al. 2002; Coyne and Orr 
2004). 
McElreath and Boyd (2007) also list the 
concept of ‘counterintuitive results’ as a way that 
models can aid our understanding of the world. 
This can, just as Caswell’s point 5, be seen as a 
subset of proving the possible, just that the 
possible was not really what we would have 
guessed before the model was built and analysed. 
Though counterintuitive results are often 
highlighted in the literature, it is important to 
remember that what was once considered 
counterintuitive can quickly become so obvious to 
scientists that this particular value is no longer 
seen. Again, Fisher’s proof that continuous 
variation can come about through inheritance of 
discrete genetic elements (Fisher 1918), was by 
many seen as counterintuitive when it was 
published, but it has been accepted as both 
intuitive, expected and not particularly surprising 
since the modern evolutionary synthesis (Mayr 
1982). 
The last, and extremely important way models 
can help us to understand the natural world, has 
little to do with the natural world (except perhaps 
its complexity) and more to do with us; models are 
of great aid in communication. This is an extension 
of the ‘models as externalized logic’ argument; not 
only do models make logic easier because we can 
do it on a piece of paper or in a computer, but it 
can also make it a lot easier to communicate our 
logic to other scientists. As an example; in a quick 
survey on the use of the concept of stability in 
ecology Grimm, Schmidt et al. (1992), found more 
than 40 different uses of the word stability. 
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 Though one might argue that we shouldn’t need 
over 40 different uses of one word, it becomes 
much clearer within any given context, if the 
particular notion of stability one is referring to can 
be algebraically defined within a particular model.  
THE MINIMAL VIEW OF MODELS 
We have now chartered some of the ways to 
legitimize the pervasive role of theory or use of 
models in ecology. In doing so, we have covered 
some ideas on how models are built (Levins), what 
models can contribute with (Haldane), what are 
legitimate theoretical pursuits with models in 
ecology and evolution (Caswell), certain 
characteristics of successful theories/models 
(Fagerström), what are basic purposes of models 
(Odenbaugh), what is the use of false models 
(Wimsatt) and lighter versions of how model use is 
introduced in some textbooks.  
The criticisms of the use of models in ecology 
and evolution presented, and their responses can be 
categorized according to how the charge was 
interpreted. I see the complaints of Simberloff 
(1981; 1982), Peters (1976; 1978; 1980; 1991), 
Andrewartha and Birch (1954) and others as being 
composed of two different claims. The first claim 
is that models tell us very little about the real 
world, and the other is such modelling activities 
are not legitimate parts of either ecology and 
evolution (Mayr 1963; Simberloff 1981) or science 
at large (Peters 1991). Most of the responses are 
methodological; i.e. they respond by claiming that 
models are legitimate tools we use to do science. 
Models can be used as conceptual frameworks 
(Odenbaugh), as ways externalize our logic 
(Haldane and others) or that general mathematical 
models can be used to analyse other models 
(Caswell). These are all arguments that are not 
directly related to telling us anything at all about 
the real world. Models as valuable tools (see 
particularly Cooper 2003), is a response to the 
charge that models are not legitimate parts of 
ecology and evolution. The perspective of models 
as tools is, however, not responses to the charge 
that many models say very little about the real 
world.  
That some models can be used to make 
predictions that can be tested is one response 
(which is often what the critics ask for), the second 
response that deals with what we can learn about 
the real world from our models is proving what is 
possible. This is, admittedly, a weak kind of 
prediction, and for some it is not to be considered a 
prediction at all (Peters 1991). However, we have 
also given quite a few examples where such proof-
of-principle have been instrumental in the history 
of ecology and evolution (Fisher’s continuous 
variation from discrete Mendelian genes, 
Hamilton’s kin selection models), and there are 
numerous others. 
My personal philosophy of models is based 
solely on this idea of proving what is possible, and 
I term this a Minimal View of Mathematical 
Models. In encountering any scientific (or 
unscientific for that matter) exposition where one 
uses any kind of mathematical model, I am not 
willing to interpret the model as ‘putting 
probabilities’ on the world at all.  
This is in opposition to both of our textbook 
examples, where the authors seem to mean that 
some models can charter all possibilities in the real 
world (Maynard-Smith 1982) or be used to show 
impossibilities in real systems (McElreath and 
Boyd 2007). My view of mathematical models in 
ecology and evolution is that even though the 
structure of the model is similar to the real world, 
we can never know how similar it is, or in which 
exact way it is similar. This means that any 
conclusion from a model needs to be taken with 
more than a pinch of salt, and that, if the 
assumptions of a model are not extremely 
unreasonable (as in Wimsatt’s “totally wrong-
headed picture of the world”), the only conclusion 
we can draw is that the world could work the way 
our model does, and therefore the conclusions of 
the model could hold in real systems. If something 
is impossible in a model, it could be impossible in 
the real world, but this is, at least in my perception, 
a less useful conclusion. 
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 The Minimal View of Models is a pragmatic 
perspective that attempts to draw lessons from the 
history of our field. It does not accept that 
impossible or unlikely in a model corresponds to 
impossible or unlikely in the world. How certain 
models of reinforcement led many to believe it was 
unlikely is an example of why; a premature 
dismissal of a particular mechanism as unlikely 
when it turn out to not be that impossible after all. 
The Minimal View is also consistent with the 
implications of Beatty’s contingency thesis; by not 
posing statements pertaining to be generalizations 
that are expected to hold (i.e. putting probabilities 
on the world), but to keep such statements as 
possibilities, give room for the idea that natural 
selection can break down any generalization. 
Whether a mechanism, pattern or any other model 
output holds for a particular system is up to 
empirical investigation.  
It is important to realize that such a view of 
models does not diminish most of the other 
purposes or legitimate pursuits explicated by the 
authors above. Haldane’s idea of externalizing our 
logic, Caswell’s ideas of demonstrating the link 
between apparently unrelated models and 
developing mathematical methods for the analysis 
of models, Odenbaugh’s ideas of models as 
conceptual framework (and most of the other 
points raised above) are all compatible with the 
Minimal View. In fact, most of the points raised by 
the defenders of mathematical models rest on 
(minimally) such a Minimal View; that the 
similarity between a model and the real world is in 
such a way that a conclusion of a model can 
possibly hold for a real system. Levin’s idea of 
robustness does not make the conclusions from 
these models more likely to hold for real systems, 
but they increase our certainty about the possibility 
of these conclusions to hold. 
This Minimal View of mathematical models as 
only proving the possible is still subject to Peters’ 
critique of them being de facto tautologies. Either 
predator-prey systems show oscillations OR they 
do not show oscillations. I am personally not so 
worried about this charge. From a historical 
perspective, we have seen that just proving the 
possible can have a substantial effect on the 
development of a field. Others have also expressed 
similar attitudes and that the charge of tautology is 
perhaps over-emphasized (Sober 2008). Taking the 
tautology “It is raining, or it is not raining” as an 
example, if we initially had no idea that it actually 
could rain (and particularly if the common belief 
was that it was impossible), such statements are of 
immense value.  
It should also be noted that the Minimal View 
does not mean that there are no ways to put 
probabilities on the world, i.e. to argue for a 
process, mechanism or pattern to be probable. It 
only states that a model alone can not do this.  
In summary: Mathematical models provide 
ecologists and evolutionary biologists with proof 
of the possible, and any conclusion about the real 
world over and above this must be based on 
empirical studies. Models do, however, serve 
important functions as tools for ecologists and 
evolutionary biologists which are legitimate parts 
of the fields, even without directly making 
predictions. 
THESIS OVERVIEW 
The models in this thesis deal with dispersal and 
diversification. Dispersal is often defined as 
‘movement that potentially leads to gene flow’ 
(e.g. Ronce 2007), i.e. movement of any kind of 
individual (adult, young, seeds or gametes) that 
can change the spatial structure of genes in a 
population. In many ecological studies, however, 
the emphasis will not be on the distribution of 
genes or alleles, but focus more on the moving 
individuals themselves. The first chapter deals 
with dispersal in a more ecological sense, by 
focusing on the presence and absence of 
individuals, without incorporating genetics. The 
second and third chapters deal with the evolution 
of dispersal and are more in line with the definition 
above.  
By diversification I intend that genotypes, in 
one way or another, diversify the phenotypic 
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 expressions (i.e. that the genotype-phenotype map 
is 1 to many). For instance, in the models in 
chapter II and III, a particular genotype can be 
seen as giving rise to individuals that differ in the 
phenotype relevant to movement. In chapter II we 
explicitly vary the way this diversification is 
achieved; if dispersal is under maternal control her 
genotype will ‘diversify’ her offspring with regard 
to how far they disperse. If, on the other hand, 
dispersal is under offspring control, this 
diversification is achieved as a randomization 
within the individuals themselves, with two 
individuals of the same genotype potentially 
dispersing different distances. Chapter III 
concludes with a simple model in which dispersal 
is modelled as a tendency to leave a natal patch; 
dispersal decisions can either be randomized 
individually among offspring, or a mother can opt 
to encase a certain fraction of her offspring with 
dispersive traits, with such ‘homeostatic’ dispersal 
strategies often being adaptive. In chapter IV we 
develop a general population genetic model in 
which a particular kind of diversification is 
investigated; diversification that is selected for by 
virtue of reducing the correlations between 
individuals of the same genotype (bet-hedging).  
REGULATION OF INVASIVE SPEEDS 
Invasive or exotic species are organisms that, for 
some reason, have managed to arrive at, establish 
and spread in areas outside their ‘natural’ range. 
Such species are in many cases seen as unwanted, 
often due to their potential of having a negative 
effect, particularly reducing local biodiversity 
(Clavero and Garcia-Berthou 2005) and having 
severe economic impacts. Ecological studies of 
invasive species have risen remarkably the last 
decades (Puth and Post 2005), no doubt because of 
a combination of ecology’s recognition of having 
to solve environmental problems and the fact that 
more and more such species have a detrimental 
effect on the natural world. 
Despite a general increase in research on 
invasive species, it has proven difficult to come up 
with generalities that can be used to predict 
success of invaders or susceptibility of 
communities to invaders (Ehler 1998). Recently, 
Arim, Abades et al. (2006) presented an empirical 
investigation of invasive species that showed a 
remarkably consistent pattern of invasions across a 
wide range of different taxa of invaders and 
communities invaded. The idea was that species 
invasion can be characterized by a particular speed 
or rate of invasion and, they argued, this rate was a 
regulated process. Regulation in this context is 
akin to the regulation of a thermostat; if there is 
too much of something it will decrease and if there 
is too little it will increase. So the regulation of 
invasion speeds would be the case if too speedy 
invasions were slowed down and too slow 
invasions were speeded up. The implications of 
this pattern could have a direct effect on what 
appropriate measures one should use to avoid the 
further invasion of an unwanted species; if we 
attempt to slow down an invasion, the species 
might just respond by increasing the speed of 
invasion. 
This was in fact what Arim, Abader et al. 
(2006) found for 30 distinct invasive species, 
ranging from mute swans, through water hyacinths 
to foot-and-mouth disease. They claimed that this 
evidence showed that invasions are a regulated 
process and that they had manage to show a 
general pattern of invasions, in contrast to the view 
of invasion as idiosyncratic phenomena (Shrader-
Frechette and McCoy 1993; Ehler 1998).  
We took notice of this article and were 
interested in finding out how this regulation at the 
level of the invading front of the population could 
actually work, i.e. we had plans for making 
mechanistic models focusing on the individuals 
that an invasion consists of, and perhaps figuring 
out what were some of the possible processes or 
mechanisms that could bring such a regulation of 
invasion speeds about. One prominent alternative 
to explain the pattern would be Allee effects, that 
small populations (i.e. recently invaded areas) can 
have a tendency to exhibit slow or even negative 
growth. However, we noticed something very 
different. 
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 As pointed out by both Caswell and 
Odenbaugh above, we started our search for how 
this regulation could come about through making 
the simplest of models, in the hope that we could 
extend these to more complex models in which 
some mechanism would create regulation of the 
speed. We developed two simple models of species 
invasions to simulate data to be analysed in the 
same way as Arim, Abades et al. (2006). The 
classic argument of robustness (Levins 1966; 
Wimsatt 1987; Caswell 1988) was the main reason 
for making two models with different assumptions. 
Both of these models were run to create patterns of 
the invasions, analysed in the same way as Arim, 
Abades et al. (2006), where there were no 
mechanisms in the model that could be said to 
plausibly create regulation of the invasion speed. 
And in fact, both of our models show patterns that 
would be interpreted as regulation using the 
measure of speed defined as in Arim, Abades et al. 
(2006), without any plausible mechanism 
generating regulation. Similar results have also 
been found by De Valpine, Cuddington et al. 
(2008). The main conclusions from this article is 
that more thought needs to be put either into the 
development of proper measures of invasion speed 
where regulation might be detected or other ways 
of analysing the invasion speed (as defined in 
Arim, Abades et al. 2006) to detect regulation. 
Since it is hard to think about speed (as 
defined) in even with the simplest of invasions, our 
models can serve as an externalization of our 
logic. Where my abilities to reason stop, a 
mathematical model can help, and in this case it 
has helped us to realize that with this particular 
measure of invasion speed, detection of regulation 
is not as easy as presumed in Arim, Abades et al. 
(2006). By using these models as an aid in our 
reasoning, we showed that the patterns discovered 
could actually be explained by how the measure of 
speed was defined, instead of indicating regulation 
of any sort. Note that our findings do not mean that 
species invasions are not regulated, but that the 
analysis of Arim, Abades et al. (2006) is not 
sufficient to detect it. 
CONFLICT OVER DISPERSAL DISTANCES 
Dispersal is often defined as ‘movement that leads 
to gene flow’, i.e. movement of individual adults, 
juveniles, eggs, seeds etc. that affect the spatial 
structure of the genetic composition of a 
population (see for instance Ronce 2007). Often 
such movement is seen as risky; by moving out of 
the habitat one is born in, the probability of 
surviving decreases and the fitness of the moving 
individual is believed to be reduced, hence 
adaptations for such movement should be selected 
against (note that this verbal reasoning can also be 
considered a model). One of the major 
contributions from mathematical models of 
dispersal has been to show that there are a number 
of mechanisms (or factors) that can lead to such 
adaptations, despite the fact that such movement is 
risky (see Clobert, Danchin et al. 2001 for an 
introduction). This is yet another example of 
models proving the possible; by showing that 
certain plausible mechanisms can in principle lead 
to the evolution of seemingly costly traits. 
The factors that have been proposed as 
selecting for dispersal are kin competition, 
inbreeding, resource competition and 
environmental variability (for a review see Bowler 
and Benton 2005). Some level of dispersal is 
favoured over complete philopatry if competition 
between kin is local; by dispersing the negative 
impact of one individual’s presence on related 
individuals with whom it shares some genes will 
be diminished (see e.g. Hamilton and May 1977; 
Frank 1986; Frank 1998). Dispersing away from 
natal patches can also be favoured to decrease the 
chance of mating with related individuals which 
leads to inbreeding (e.g. Perrin and Mazalov 
1999), often thought to have negative fitness 
consequences. 
In kin selection theory, one often imagines 
individuals maximizing inclusive fitness (Hamilton 
1964a; Hamilton 1964b; Frank 1998; McElreath 
and Boyd 2007), where an individual’s inclusive 
fitness will be its own regular fitness, plus the 
fitness of related individuals, weighted by their 
relatedness. In other words, my inclusive fitness 
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 does not only include my own offspring, but also 
my brother’s offspring discounted by our degree of 
relatedness (Hamilton 1964a; Hamilton 1964b; 
Grafen 1985; McElreath and Boyd 2007). In such 
a perspective, which individual mechanistically 
controls the development of these dispersive traits 
is of importance. When investigating the evolution 
of dispersal in higher plants, adaptations for 
dispersal occurs through the development of the 
maternal tissue surrounding the fertilized egg, 
which is determined by the genome of the mother 
plant. However, in most mobile animals, it is more 
likely that dispersal strategies are primarily 
determined by the genotype of the dispersing 
animal itself. The inclusive fitness calculations 
will in models of dispersal differ between these 
two perspectives (Grafen 1985; Frank 1998); in the 
perspective of the mother, all seeds have the 
potential to contribute equally to her inclusive 
fitness, whereas if individuals control their own 
dispersal, their siblings (indirect fitness) are not 
weighed as much as their own (direct) fitness.  
Considerations of the relatedness structure 
have led earlier models of dispersal evolution to 
show that there can be a parent-offspring conflict 
over dispersive traits (Motro 1983;  or a 
'battleground', Godfray 1990). It is termed a 
conflict since the optimal dispersal behaviour 
differs between a maternal and an offspring 
perspective; in general dispersal by individuals 
determined by their parents (as in plants) favour 
higher rates of dispersal, compared to similar 
circumstances where the individuals determine 
their own propensity to disperse (as expected in 
most animals). These models investigate the 
evolution of dispersal rates, where the spatial 
structure of the population is implicit, i.e. that the 
population is modelled as consisting of a large 
number of patches, and that dispersal occurs 
through leaving a focal patch and potentially land 
in any other patch (e.g. Motro 1982a; 1982b; 
1983). Such a scenario is often construed as 
unrealistic and that we should also model dispersal 
in a spatially explicit context, where all patches are 
not equally ‘connected’ (Travis and French 2000; 
Ronce 2007). In such contexts, dispersal 
propensities are usually modelled as dispersal 
kernels, which are distributions that determine the 
probability of an individual moving a particular 
distance (Travis and French 2000; Rousset and 
Gandon 2002; Ronce 2007). 
In the models presented in chapter II we 
investigate the potential for a parent-offspring 
conflict over dispersal distances, using different 
dispersal kernels. Again, robustness arguments led 
us to develop two models that differ in how the 
distribution of dispersal distances is implemented. 
In the simplest case, an individual’s probability of 
moving a particular distance is controlled by a 
single diploid locus, determining the mean value of 
an exponential distribution. In the more complex 
model, we introduce 10 loci each determining an 
(unscaled) probability of moving a particular 
distance. Both models yield the same conclusion; 
there can be a conflict over dispersal behaviour, 
when dispersal is modelled in a spatially explicit 
context. Again, arriving at such a conclusion 
without the use of a mathematical model in our 
reasoning would be quite the challenge.  
THE MULTICAUSAL NATURE OF DISPERSAL 
The multicausal theory of dispersal is a semantic 
view of the theory of dispersal (Lloyd 1988; 
Thompson 1989), where the theory of dispersal is 
considered the collection or family of models that 
deal with the phenomena of dispersal and the 
interpretations of these models. The relation 
between these models is not axiomatic, i.e. they 
can not all be derived from a common set of true 
assumptions, but they are related semantically; 
what we intend by dispersal as defined verbally 
can be put into models in different ways. In some 
models dispersal is formalized as a rate of leaving 
a patch, in other models it can be seen as a 
dispersal kernel (as in chapter II) and in yet 
different models, dispersal can be used to denote 
the strategies by which individuals decide to stay 
or leave a particular patch. This manuscript 
charters some of these models, and focuses 
particularly on how ideas of causality are used in 
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 dispersal theory. In addition we highlight that, 
even though models come with interpretations, for 
some models several different interpretations are 
valid. 
In evolutionary thinking causes are usually 
categorized into proximate and ultimate 
(Tinbergen 1963; Mayr 1988).  An individual 
might move out of a particular area because of the 
sudden appearence of a threatening predator, and 
the presence of this predator can be seen as a 
proximate cause of this movement. On the other 
(ultimate) hand, if such predators become more 
common over a long enough period of time, it can 
also be seen as an ultimate cause of the 
evolutionary changes in how these prey individuals 
respond to the presence of predators.  
In addition to the ultimate/proximate 
distinction, causes can also be said to be either 
deterministic or probabilistic. The sight of a 
predator can either always make an individual 
move (deterministic) or it can increase the 
probability that it moves. All of these notions of 
causality are invoked in models of dispersal. As an 
example Travis, Murrell et al. (1999) construct an 
evolutionary model (ultimate causation) where 
individuals have a particular probability of 
dispersing (probabilistic causation) depending on 
the density in the patch they are born in (proximate 
causation). 
We also emphasize that models are more than 
just the mathematics; models come with 
interpretations as well, and that in many models 
dispersal is implemented in ways that can be 
interpreted in more than one way. For instance, in 
some evolutionary models of dispersal rates, these 
rates are often interpreted as the fraction of 
individuals dispersing from a single patch, the 
fraction of offspring of an individual that disperses 
or the probability of a given individual to disperse 
(e.g. Hamilton and May 1977; Frank 1986; Frank 
1998). A small simulation model is constructed to 
show that, while these different interpretations are 
valid for some models, they can be teased apart in 
other models. This model also functions as a 
proof-of-principle of the idea of dispersal 
homeostasis, where selection favours that offspring 
are divided into fractions that disperse or stay 
philopatric, instead of letting dispersal propensities 
be probabilistic for all these offspring. Thus the 
causality of dispersal itself (probabilistic or 
deterministic) is considered to be under 
evolutionary change. In addition to proving that 
dispersal homeostasis can work, the model also 
serves as a robustness check (see Levins section, 
and Caswell’s (4)) on earlier models predicting 
rates of dispersal (Hamilton and May 1977; Motro 
1982a; Frank 1986; Frank 1998). 
BET-HEDGING; MEANS, VARIANCES AND 
CORRELATIONS 
When the returns of an investment are uncertain, 
putting all your money in one single stock is 
unwise; instead diversifying the investment is 
recommended to minimize risk of losses. For 
instance, a classic recommendation in the financial 
literature is to diversify one’s investments in assets 
whose expected returns are negatively correlated, 
e.g. buying stocks in an company selling umbrellas 
and one selling ice-cream (e.g. Brealey, Myers et 
al. 2001 p 272ff; Penman 2003 p 649-650). The 
main effect of this is to reduce the variability of the 
total profit; the variance in the payoff of your 
investment will decrease, since periods when one 
stock does badly the second one goes up. In other 
words, it’s not always wise to put all your eggs in 
one basket. 
Similar mechanisms can be at work in 
evolutionary thinking; just as variance in financial 
investments is unwanted, so can variance of fitness 
be detrimental for the success of a genotype. These 
ideas have lead to the concept of bet-hedging 
(Slatkin 1974; Seger and Brockmann 1987; 
Philippi and Seger 1989); that strategies with a 
reduced variance in fitness can invade a population 
consisting of individuals that on average do better. 
One way to achieve this is through phenotypic 
diversification. In the same way as investments in 
different stocks reduces variance in total financial 
payoff, a genotype that gives rise to different 
30
 phenotypes which have uncorrelated fitnesses also 
achieves a lower variance in genotypic fitness.  
In this conceptual review we use a population 
genetic model to show how variability in fitness at 
the level of the genotype can be broken down into 
variance at the level of the individual, and 
correlations among individual fitnesses. We 
highlight that variance in fitness has effects both 
for short-term and long-term evolutionary changes, 
and that bet-hedging theory can more easily be 
understood when the variance in genotypic fitness 
is separated into variance of fitness at the level of 
individuals and the correlation among these 
individuals. 
The general model can be seen as a conceptual 
framework (in the sense of Odenbaugh), whereby 
the breakdown of genotypic variance into a 
product of correlation and variance among 
individuals gives a clearer mathematical 
underpinning of two classic ways to categorize 
(i.e. conceptualize) bet-hedging strategies 
(conservative vs. diversified, and within-
generation vs. between-generation). The general 
model is also used to show that both of these 
categorizations are in fact false dichotomies and 
are better viewed as ends at two continua along 
which bet-hedging strategies can be placed. As 
such the model also suggests that this separation of 
correlation and individual level variance can be 
used as a way to better understand, if not analyse 
other more specific models of bet-hedging (for 
instance models that are developed to investigate 
the potential for bet-hedging in dormancy, 
ovipositioning or dispersal), in line with the 
comments made by (Maynard-Smith 1982) of a 
division between general and more specific 
theories. 
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